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ABSTRACT

As the field of robotics matures robots will need some
method of displaying and modeling emotions. One way
of doing this is to use a human-like face on which the
robot can make facial expressions corresponding to its
emotional state. Yet the connection between a robot’s
emotional state and its physical facial expression is not
an obvious one: while a smile can gradually increase or
decrease in size, there is no principled method of using boolean logic to map changes in facial expressions
to changes in emotional states. We give a philosophical
analysis of the problem and show that it is rooted in the
vagueness of robot emotions. We then outline several
methods that have been used in the philosophical literature to model vagueness and propose an experiment
that uses our humanoid robot head to determine which
philosophical theory is best suited to the task.
INTRODUCTION

It has been argued that the ability to display emotions
on a human-like face is both an important and necessary step in making robots and computer agents more
accessible to the general public [1, 7]. The emotional
model for a robotic face will have two key components:
a mapping of emotional states to facial positions and a
method of transitioning between different pairs of emotional states and facial positions. For example, we map
‘happy’ on our robot to a widening of its face and eyes
and a slight opening of its mouth: in other words, a
smile. We say the robot is ‘sad’ when its eyes fall and
face narrows. Some method is now needed of transitioning between ‘happy’ and ‘sad’ that both displays
the transition on the robot’s face and captures the emotional state of the robot throughout the transition.
We begin by introducing our notation and the philosophical problem of vagueness. We then show how, in
boolean logic, there is no principled method of selecting a particular facial position to use as the boundary

between two different emotional states. The problem
arises because robot emotions, along with many linguistic predicates in natural language, are vague. Philosophers have studied paradoxes of vagueness since antiquity and while they are no closer to solving problems
of vagueness than computer scientists, an examination
of the philosophical problem of vagueness will allow
researchers to better model emotions and their corresponding facial expressions in a robot face.
PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATIONS

The robot head we are using consists of many parts,
each of which is controlled by a servo. Let v̂ be a vector that contains the variables which denote the servo’s
position. We use Pv̂ to denote the head’s position when
the servos are set to the positions contained in v̂. For
example, v̂ = {100, 90, 40} would set f ace width = 100,
eyelid width = 90, and mouth open = 40. Although
our particular robot head contains up to 16 servos, we
have combined some and omitted others from v̂ to simplify our examples. We define the following vectors:
ˆ = {100, 100, 40}
v1
ˆ = {85, 100, 40}
v2
ˆ = {50, 100, 40}
v3
ˆ = {15, 100, 40}
v4
ˆ = {0, 100, 40}
v5
Each emotional state is denoted by a boolean variable
Sα , whose value is returned by the function t. We use
Sh to denote the emotional state ‘happy’. The robot
is ‘happy’ if and only if t(Sh ) = 1; the robot is ‘not
happy’ if and only if t(Sh ) = 0. We use ¬ to denote logical negation; thus, ¬Sh denotes the state ‘not happy’.
Because we are initially working in boolean logic, we
assume that if the robot is ‘not happy’ it is ‘sad’; thus,
the robot is ‘sad’ when t(Sh ) = 0, or t(¬Sh ) = 1. To
denote the robot’s emotional state given its facial position, expressed as a vector v̂, we use Sαv̂ .
Events cause, among other things, the robot’s facial position to move. For example, as negative events occur
the robot’s smile will slowly disappear. As is the case
with humans, multiple facial positions can correspond
ˆ and v2
ˆ map
to the same emotion. For example, both v1
to state Sh , meaning t(Shv1
)
=
1
and
t(S
)
=
1. We
hv2
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
let v4 and v5 map to state ‘sad’, ¬Sh , which means

t(¬Shv4
) = 1 and t(¬Shv5
) = 1.
ˆ
ˆ
THE VAGUENESS OF ROBOT EMOTIONS

Suppose we want to build a robot office assistant that,
among other things, delivers mail to office employees.
ˆ
We define its facial position as Pv6
ˆ , where v6 =
ˆ
ˆ
{i, 100, 40}. Note that when i = 100, v6 = v1, and
t(Shv6
) = 1. Each time the robot successfully completes
ˆ
a task we increase i to make the robot look happier,
and each time the robot fails to complete a task we
decrease i to make the robot look sadder. For example,
if the robot spills coffee on a human we might set i =
i−70, but if the robot delivers an envelope to the wrong
employee we might only set i = i − 1.
The Boundary Between Sh and ¬Sh

The fundamental problem with this model is that we
cannot determine the i that marks the location where
the robot changes from state Sh to state ¬Sh . Suppose
the face is in position Pv3
ˆ . We are just as justified
in holding that position Pv3
ˆ corresponds to state ¬Sh
as we are in holding that position Pv3
ˆ corresponds to
state Sh . We do not want to arbitrarily assign Pv3
ˆ to
Sh or ¬Sh , as to hold that position Pv3
ˆ is the precise
cut-off between emotional states Sh and ¬Sh is to hold
that while some large number of negative events may
occur to move the robot’s face from position Pv1
ˆ to Pv3
ˆ,
the robot’s emotional state remains constant at Sh ; yet
if one small, seemingly insignificant event causes the
robot’s face to move past position Pv3
ˆ and toward Pv4
ˆ,
the robot’s emotional state will suddenly change from
Sh to ¬Sh . This is clearly counterintuitive as, among
healthy humans, small, insignificant actions should not
cause sudden changes in emotional states.

while the physical transition between the appearance of
‘happy’ and the appearance of ‘sad’ is gradual, as it is
with humans, the transition between Sh and ¬Sh is not:
despite its physical appearance, the robot will believe
it is as happy when i = 51 as it is when i = 85. When i
is decremented by one unit the change in facial position
will be hardly noticable, yet its mood instantaneously
changes from ‘happy’ to ‘sad’: from Sh to ¬Sh .
The Logic

The problem in the above example lies in our belief
that one insignificant event does not make the difference between emotional states. The linguistic vagueness that philosophers typically study works similarly:
words like ‘bald’ are said to be vague because one hair
does not seem to make the difference between baldness
and non-baldness. Let Shv6
indicate that the robot is
ˆ
i
in state Sh and in position Pv6
ˆ , given the value of i in
ˆ Thus, t(Sh ˆ ) = 1, since when i = 100, v6
ˆ = v1.
ˆ
v6.
v6100

In boolean logic, we symbolize our belief that one insignificant event does not make the difference between
Sh and ¬Sh as follows: ∀n(Shv6
⊃ Shv6
). Yet given
ˆn
ˆ
n−1
this, we can prove that there is no i that marks the
cut-off between Sh and ¬Sh (see Figure 1).
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Suppose we use Pv3
ˆ as the boundary between Sh and
¬Sh . Recall that the face of the office robot is in position Pv6
ˆ and suppose that, at a given point during
ˆ = v2
ˆ we know the robot is
the day, i = 85: since v6
‘happy’. If the robot spills coffee on an employee then
ˆ = v4;
ˆ the robot becomes ‘sad’.
i = 85 − 70 = 15 and v6
This result conforms to our intuition that if a person
is happy and they make a big mistake, such as spilling
coffee on a co-worker, they will become unhappy.

Figure 1. Proof: if the robot is ‘happy’ when in
Pv6
ˆ 100 , then it is ‘happy’ when in Pv6
ˆ0

Now suppose i = 85 and the robot brings a piece of mail
to the wrong employee: i = 85 − 1 = 84. This result
also conforms to our intuitions: if a person is happy and
they make a small mistake, such as bringing a piece of
mail to the wrong person, they don’t stop being happy.
Now suppose this occurs 36 times: i = 84 − 1 = · · · =
50 − 1 = 49. When the robot incorrectly delivers the
mail for the 35th time it is still happy, because i =
50, although its smile has nearly disappeared; however,
once the robot delivers mail to the wrong person for the
36th time, its mood immediately changes from ‘happy’
to ‘sad’, even though its physical appearance — the
diminished smile that is visible when i = 50 — has
changed by an imperceptibly small amount, namely by
one unit, such that i = 50−1 = 49. The problem is that

Thus, having started with an obviously true premise,
namely Shv6
, we can conclude that when i = 0 the
ˆ
100
robot is still ‘happy’; t(Shv6
) = 1. We could construct
ˆ
0
a similar argument, starting with ¬Shv6
and assuming
ˆ
0
∀n(¬Shv6
⊃ ¬Shv6
), to show that when i = 100 the
ˆn
ˆ
n+1
robot is still ‘not happy’: t(¬Shv6
) = 1. Because we
ˆ
100
are in boolean logic, where a robot that is ‘not happy’ is
‘sad’, we have been able to prove two seemingly contradictory facts. We proved both that the robot is ‘happy’
when i = 0 and its facial expression is ‘sad’, and that
the robot is ‘sad’ when i = 100 and its facial expression
is ‘happy’. While boolean logic requires that we find
some vector, and thus some i, to use as the boundary
between Sh and ¬Sh , philosophers have developed sev-

1

1

0

0

eral theories of vagueness that we propose will resolve
this contradiction and properly model robot emotions.
PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES

Typically, philosophical theories of vagueness give both
a metaphysical account of the phenomenon of vagueness and an account of our linguistic use of vague predicates. While our work is focused on modeling emotions
in practical applications, the metaphysical content of
these theories should not be disregard: as the field of
human-robot interaction matures it is likely that scholarship will focus not only on the results achieved by
a given method but on the correctness of using that
method in the first place. In this section we present
an overview of several theories of vagueness that seem
particularly well-suited for the task of modeling robot
emotions and controlling facial expressions; it is not our
intent to give a detailed account of the philosophical literature. References for further reading are provided.
3-Valued Logics

For any variable P in boolean logic, either P is true or P
is false. By introducing additional truth values, manyvalued logics allow P to take other values. Many-valued
logics are extensions of classical logic and always have
‘true’ and ‘false’ as truth values which behave, in relation to one another, as they would in classical logic
[3, p. 5]. We use a Lukasiewicz 3-valued logic, which
has the following truth values: [0, 12 , 1]. A truth value
of 12 represents an indeterminable truth value that is
assigned to that which is possible and exists between
‘the true’ and ‘the false’; that is, 21 is truer than what
is false but falser than what is true [8]. Given two variables P and Q, negation, conjunction, disjunction, and
implication are defined thusly:
t(¬P ) = 1 − t(P )
t(P ∧ Q) = min(t(P ), t(Q))
t(P ∨ Q) = max(t(P ), t(Q))
t(P → Q) = min(1, 1 − t(P ) + t(Q))
To model emotions in a 3-valued logic, we first determine which positions clearly correspond to Sh and
which clearly correspond to ¬Sh . There are two ways
that a 3-valued logic models states that are neither
clearly Sh nor clearly ¬Sh : on the truth gap theory,
these borderline cases are neither Sh nor ¬Sh while on
the truth glut theory they are both Sh and ¬Sh . On
both truth gap and truth glut theories we have the following truth assignments: t(Shv6
) = 1, t(Shv6
) = 12 ,
ˆ
ˆ
100
50
and t(Shv6
) = 0. Recall that in section 1 the state
ˆ
0
‘sad’ was said to be equivalent to the state ¬Sh : in
boolean logic, if the robot is not in state Sh , such that
t(Sh ) = 1, then the robot must be in state ¬Sh , such
that t(Sh ) = 0. On the 3-valued approach, however, a
robot that is not in state Sh need not be in state ¬Sh :
when t(Sh ) = 12 the robot is not in state Sh nor is it
in state ¬Sh . For more information on 3-valued logics
and vagueness, see [8],[9], and [10].

Epistemicism

Epistemicism [11] holds that words like ‘tall’ and ‘bald’
have sharp boundaries that are necessarily unknowable
to us. If we extend this view to emotions like ‘happy’,
we must hold that when the robot is in Pv3
ˆ it is really
either in state Sh or ¬Sh — but we can never know
which state it truly belongs in. Of course, we can program the robot to treat Pv3
ˆ as though corresponds to
Sh , but this will yield the same sudden change in emotional state that we are trying to avoid. The strengths
of this theory are primarily metaphysical, and the only
practical advantage it offers is that it allows us to model
vagueness, and emotions, in boolean logic.
To model emotions according to epistemic principles, we
need to hold that there are precise facial expressions —
some of which are unknown to us — that correspond to
the robot appearing happy; all other facial expressions
correspond to the robot looking unhappy. Thus, Pv1
ˆ
corresponds to the robot looking happy and Pv5
ˆ corresponds to the robot looking unhappy. Yet according to
the epistemicist, we have no way of knowing what the
actual position of the cut-off is: we only know that it
exists. Because epistemicism was developed for linguistic vagueness, many complications arise when attempting to model robot emotions using this theory. One
possibility is to have the robot inform the user that it
does not know whether it is happy or sad when in Pv3
ˆ;
another is to have the robot stop expressing emotion altogether when it is in indeterminate positions like Pv3
ˆ
and continue expressing emotions when it returns to a
position where its emotional state is clear, such as Pv2
ˆ.
Fuzzy Logic

Fuzzy logic has been proposed by philosophers and used
by computer scientists to model linguistic vagueness;
computer scientists have already developed several emotional models based on fuzzy logic [4, 5]. Fuzzy logic is
an infinitely-valued logic, with truth values represented
on the interval of real numbers [0, 1]. Variables, and in
this case emotional states, are represented by fuzzy sets
and objects in the domain are members of each set to
varying degrees; the degree to which a particular variable belongs in the set TRUE is a variable’s degree
of truth. Negation, conjunction, and disjunction are
defined as they are in 3-valued logic, and implication
typically is as well, although other definitions are sometimes used. Thus, we initially know that t(Shv6
)=1
ˆ
100
and t(Shv6
)
=
0.
We
map
the
other
values
of
i
to
truth
ˆ
0
values using a membership function. Suppose the robot
is clearly happy when i > 80 and clearly unhappy when
i < 30. One possible membership function is:
if i < 30 then t(Shv6
)=0
ˆ
i
if 30 ≤ i ≤ 80 then t(Shv6
)=
ˆ
i
if i > 80 then t(Shv6
)
=
1
ˆ

i−30
50

i

Using this function, the robot’s emotional state changes
along with its smile. When i = 70 the robot is ‘happy’

to degree 0.8 and ‘not happy’ to degree 0.2, t(Shv6
)=
ˆ
70
0.8; when i = 60 the robot is ‘happy’ to degree 0.4
and ‘not happy’ to degree 0.6, t(Shv6
) = 0.4. More
ˆ
60
information on fuzzy logic and fuzzy set theory can be
found in [2] and [6].
USER STUDY: SELECTING A THEORY

Because we are not presently interested in the metaphysical claims of the theories described in the previous section, we must use some other criterion to determine which theory is best suited for mapping facial
expressions to a robot’s emotional state. Each theory
of vagueness treats positions like Pv3
ˆ differently: on the
3-valued approach Pv3
ˆ corresponds either to both Sh
and ¬Sh or to neither Sh nor ¬Sh , while on the fuzzy
logic approach Pv3
ˆ partially corresponds to Sh and partially corresponds to ¬Sh . On the epistemic view Pv3
ˆ
corresponds to either Sh or ¬Sh , but it is impossible for
us to know which. We propose conducting experiments
with a robot face to test user’s perceptions of emotions
that are not clearly ‘happy’ nor clearly ‘sad’ to see how
they perceive this borderline area.
Our experiment will begin with the head engaging in
a scripted one-way interaction with the user. The user
will be filling out a form in an office setting, with the
robot seated across the table; note that only the upper
body is visible to the user. At some point an event will
occur that causes the robot to enter state Sh and move
to position Pv1
ˆ ; recall that Pv1
ˆ makes the robot’s face
look as ‘happy’ as possible. The user will be explicitly
informed that, when in this position, the robot is happiest. An event will then occur that causes the robot’s
face to move to position Pv5
ˆ and enter state ¬Sh ; recall that Pv5
ˆ makes the robot’s face look as ‘unhappy’
as possible. Again, the user will be explicitly informed
that, when in this position, the robot is least happy.
We then let the user fill out the forms as a distraction
task. Once a brief period of time has passed, the phone
will ring and the robot head will answer, using a headset. While the user will only be able to hear the voice
of the robot speaking, they will hear a muffled voice to
indicate that someone is speaking to the robot over the
phone. At various points in the phone call the robot’s
face will move to positions between Pv1
ˆ and Pv5
ˆ ; recall
that these positions are between positions that make
the robot appear clearly happy and clearly unhappy.
Each time the face takes a new position the scenario
will ‘pause’ and a facilitator will ask the user to describe the emotional state of the robot. The user will
be able to choose one of the following options: ‘happy’,
‘not happy’, ‘happy and not happy’, ‘neither happy nor
not happy’, ‘either happy or not happy, but unsure of
which’, or ‘partially happy and partially not happy’.
The first two options conform to a traditional emotional
model, while the last four are used to represent the theories of vagueness that were described in the previous
section. We hypothesize that users will choose one of
the first two options when the robot’s state is obvious;

when the state is difficult to determine, we believe users
will choose one of the last four options. If a significant
percentage of users choose one of the last four options
when the robot is in an intermediate state, then we will
have evidence indicating which theory of vagueness can
be best used to control robot emotions and facial expressions.
We hope to conduct this test using at least the emotions
‘happy’ and ‘surprised’. The scenario for ‘surprised’ will
differ from the previously described scenario for ‘happy’.
If the data shows that users associate intermediate positions with a given theory of vagueness, then we will
use literature on that theory to develop a more detailed
model of robot emotions.
CONCLUSION

In this paper we reported our efforts to model synthetic emotions in a humanoid robot head using facial
expressions based on philosophical theories of vagueness. We begun by highlighting the importance of accurate and valid emotional states in robotic interfaces
and how these might be expressed through facial expressions. We argued that vagueness is a practical challenge when attempting to model convincing and interactive robotic emotions based on facial expressions. We
presented three philosophical theories of vagueness that
might be used in accurately modeling robotic emotions
and facial expressions, and outlined a user study that
will enable us to evaluate and compare the usability and
effectiveness of these theories. We are currently applying the methodologies presented in the paper using a
humanoid robot head that serves as our testbed for implementing the different facial expression models and
for conducting the proposed user study.
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